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ABSTRACT Electrocardiogram (ECG) has been investigated as promising biometrics, but it cannot be
canceled and re-used once compromised just like other biometrics. We propose methods to overcome the
issue of irrevocability in ECG biometrics without compromising performance. Our proposed cancelable user
authentication uses a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) based on a composite hypothesis testing in
compressive sensing (CS) domain. We also propose a permutation-based revocation method for CS-based
cancelable biometrics so that it becomes resilient to record multiplicity attack. In addition, to compensate
for inevitable performance degradation due to cancelable schemes, we also propose two performance
improvement methods without undermining cancelable schemes: a self-guided ECG filtering and a T-wave
shift model in our CS-GLRT. Finally, our proposedmethods were evaluated for various cancelable biometrics
criteria with the public ECG-ID data (89 subjects). Our cancelable ECG biometric methods yielded up to
93.0% detection probability at 2.0% false alarm ratio (PD*) and 3.8% equal error rate (EER), which are
comparable to or even better than non-cancelable baseline with 93.2% PD* and 4.8% EER for challenging
single-pulse ECG authentication, respectively. Our proposed methods met all cancelable biometrics criteria
theoretically or empirically. Our cancelable secure user template with our novel revocation process is
practically non-invertible and robust to record multiplicity attack.
INDEX TERMS Cancelable biometrics, ECG biometrics, generalized likelihood ratio test, compressive
sensing, single pulse ECG.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. ELECTROCARDIOGRAM AS BIOMETRICS
Biometrics such as fingerprint, face, and iris provide con-
venient and powerful security tools to verify or identify
individuals. Fingerprint recognition has been widely used
in smart phone authentication, computer login, and access
control system for buildings. Face recognition and iris-based
user verification are often used in modern electronic devices.
Biometrics are now combined with electronic passport for
border control systems in many countries.1 Combining more
than one biometrics as multimodal biometrics has been
widely investigated for high performance authentication [1].
A comprehensive review on recent biometrics research can
be found in [2].
1International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 9303 Machine
Readable Travel Documents Part 1
Electrocardiogram (ECG) has been investigated as a
promising biometrics for authentication, identification and
liveness validation [3]–[5]. One pulse of an ECG signal
consists of P wave, QRS complex, and T wave that are
from atrial depolarization, ventricular depolarization, and
ventricular repolarization, respectively [6]. These charac-
teristics depend on the structure and biological substrate
of a heart which are known to be different on each per-
son [7]. Previous studies have demonstrated that using
ECG signals as a biometrics is a promising tool for
authentication [3], [8]–[10].
It is worth noting that recent works on ECG biometrics
have made significant progress so that ECG biometrics can
be potentially used in various daily activities through wear-
able ECG sensors and devices. Wearable ECG sensors have
been investigated for long-term health monitoring [11], [12]
and have recently been commercialized such as Samsung
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S-Patch and Apple Watch Series 4. There have been recent
works on ECG biometrics for wearable devices in terms of
wearable ECG band development [13], low power circuit
design [14], and light-weight authentication algorithm [15].
ECG has also been investigated as part of multimodal biomet-
ric systems with fingerprint/face [16], voice [17] or sub-skin
structure [18].
B. CANCELABLE ECG BIOMETRICS
Biometrics is a convenient and powerful tool, but one of the
drawbacks is its irrevocability. If a password is compromised,
this password can be immediately canceled and then a new
password can be generated. However, once biometrics is
compromised, it cannot be canceled and re-used since bio-
metrics cannot be changed forever. Strengthening the secu-
rity level of biometric systems can be one solution [19].
However, it is desirable to have cancelable schemes in
biometrics.
Bolle et al. [20] proposed a concept of cancelable bio-
metrics for protecting user-specific features. Teoh et al. [21]
summarized four criteria that cancelable biometrics should
satisfy based on the work of Maltoni et al. [22]:
1. Efficiency: cancelable biometrics should not deteriorate
recognition performance.
2. Re-usability: there should be straightforward revocation
and reissue procedures in the event of compromise.
3. Diversity: the same cancelable template should not be
used in two different applications.
4. Non-invertibility: the recovery of the original biometric
template from cancelable biometrics should be prevented.
Note that performance under lost key scenario is often sepa-
rately considered for cancelable biometrics.
There have been several works on cancelable biomet-
rics for fingerprint [23], [24], face [25], [26] and iris [27].
Cancelable multimodal biometrics have also been proposed
and investigated recently [28]. These cancelable biomet-
rics works are usually based on Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL)
lemma [29] or compressive sensing (CS) [30]. They both
showed that the distance between two signals can be approxi-
mately preserved before and after random projections of them
if the random projection matrix is properly designed. Thus,
randomly projected biometric signals or features can be used
for authentication or identification. Cancelable face biomet-
rics was investigated based on JL lemma [21], [25]. Other
works for cancelable biometrics were based on CS theory
for iris [27]. There have been some works on cancelable
biometrics using BioHash for face [26]. More comprehen-
sive reviews on cancelable biometrics/multimodal biometrics
are in [31]–[33].
Unfortunately, protecting biometric information with can-
celable schemes often comes with the price of lowering
authentication performance [31], [34], [35]. Even though
compressed biometric signals may well-preserve the distance
between signals based on JL lemma or CS theory, usual
choice for distance metric is Euclidean distance or its variant,
which may be sub-optimal. It is also important to note that
CS theory has been developed for recovering the original
unknown signal from compressed samples [30]. Thus, it is
crucial to ensure that a CS based cancelable biometrics yields
similar authentication performance, is almost non-invertible
and is resilient to record multiplicity attack.
Unlike other biometrics, cancelable schemes for ECG
have not been well-investigated. Dey et al. [36] investigated
cancelable ECG biometrics using BioHash. Using highly
compressed ECG using Hadamard transform yielded good
identification performance [37], but this is invertible.
Applications of CS theory for ECG have been investigated
for compression or classification [38]–[40]. So far, there has
been no prior work on cancelable ECG biometrics using CS
theory that deals with the issue of performance degradation
due to cancelable schemes, near-optimal distance metric for
compressed samples, and validation for cancelable biomet-
rics criteria altogether.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS AND ORGANIZATION
In this article, we propose a cancelable ECG biomet-
rics by deriving a near-optimal generalized likelihood ratio
test (GLRT) from a composite hypothesis testing in CS
domain. Recently, CS was applied to conventional statis-
tical signal processing such as detection and filtering and
further it shows more efficient when the signals are pro-
cessed under CS domain [41], [42]. Therefore, we conjec-
ture that our proposed GLRT in CS domain is efficient,
but not recoverable with appropriately small sample size.
We also propose a novel revocation process for CS based
cancelable biometrics that is robust to record multiplicity
attack. Our proposed GLRT method was investigated for
cancelable biometrics criteria (efficiency, re-usability, diver-
sity and non-invertibility) [21]. To the authors’ knowledge,
this article is the first work of combining CS theory with
ECG biometrics for cancelable ECG biometrics with near-
optimal metric, of considering record multiplicity attack, and
of evaluating the proposed method for cancelable biometrics
criteria.
For performance degradation due to cancelable biometrics
scheme, we developed two performance improvement
methods by extending our previous performance boost-
ing works [43], [44] that could potentially undermine
our cancelable biometric schemes. Our newly developed
methods yielded comparable performance to the previ-
ous works without compromising cancelable biometric
scheme.
Part of the proposed works was presented at the 2017 IEEE
EMBC [45]. In this article, we significantly extended our
previous work by developing new revocation process for
CS based biometrics to prevent record multiplicity attack,
proposing two performance boosting tricks called self-guided
filter and GLRT with T-wave shift model that can be
used in cancelable ECG biometrics without compromising
strong security level, and performing in-depth analyses for
the cancelability of our proposed methods with extensive
simulations.
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Section II reviews backgrounds on ECG signal modeling
and CS based statistical signal processing. Then, Section III
describes our proposed methods: cancelable ECG based
authentication method with GLRT in CS domain, permu-
tation based revocation procedure for CS based cancelable
biometrics, performance boost tricks for cancelable ECG
biometrics, and cancelable biometrics criteria with analytical
arguments. Section IV illustrates simulation results using the
public ECG-ID data set [46] from the PhysioNet [47].We also
investigated if our proposed cancelable ECG biometric meth-
ods satisfy cancelable biometrics criteria and is robust to
record multiplicity attack experimentally. Sections V and VI
present discussion and conclusion for our proposed
methods.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ECG SIGNAL MODELING AND AUTHENTICATION
An acquired ECG signal is usually contaminated by unwanted
noise or artifacts such as baseline drift, power-line noise,
and/or high frequency noise. Slowly varying baseline drift
can be corrected by high-pass filtering or wavelet based
drift correction. Power-line noise is on a specific frequency
(50 or 60 Hz) that can be reduced by bandstop filters (see [48]
for details). High frequency noise can be reduced by low-
pass filtering, but this filtering could also remove some high
frequency details of an original ECG signal. Thus, low-pass
filtering should be used with care to preserve details, while
to reduce noise. Then, for the pre-processed ECG signal,
R-peak detection is performed using algorithms such as Pan-
Tompkins method [49] so that R-peak aligned ECG pulses
can be extracted. We model a pre-processed, R-peak aligned
ECG pulse as f ∈ RK such that
f = x+ n (1)
where x ∈ RK is an original ECG pulse, n ∈ RK is high
frequency noise, and K is the length of a R-peak aligned,
extracted ECG pulse.
A conventional user authentication is done by measuring
the distance between an enrolled ECG signal or feature set
{f1, . . . , fN } for N number of ECG pulses and an input ECG
signal or feature set {s1, . . . , sM } for M number of ECG
pulses as follows:
d({f1, . . . , fN }, {s1, . . . , sM })
reject
≷
accept
γ (2)
where d is a distance metric or classifier for two sig-
nals or feature sets and γ is a threshold. It has been shown
that ECG user authentication methods can yield better per-
formance with more ECG signals (or larger N , M ) [9].
One of the ECG user authentication methods for limited
memory and computation power is to use a single user
template
t = 1
N
N∑
i=1
fi ∈ RK (3)
and a single ECG pulse s = s1 with a simple Euclidean
distance:
d({t}, {s}) =
√√√√√ K∑
j=1
(t[j]− s[j])2
reject
≷
accept
γ ′ (4)
where t[j] is the jth sample of the vector t and γ ′ is a thresh-
old. It has been shown that this simple metric is actually a
generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) if n follows an inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d .) Gaussian distribu-
tion [44]. This method has been demonstrated to be effective
for user authentication when proper performance improve-
ment methods with mild computation increases are used
together [43], [44].
B. SIGNAL PROCESSING WITH
COMPRESSIVE MEASUREMENT
CS theory has been evolved from estimation based signal
recovery with compressive measurement [50], [51] to other
statistical signal processing problems such as filtering and
signal detection [41], [42]. Davenport et al. [42] proposed a
hypothesis testing for compressive measurement:
H0 : y = 8n ∼ p0(y)
H1 : y = 8(x+ n) ∼ p1(y) (5)
where y ∈ RL is a measured vector, x ∈ RK is a known,
deterministic signal, n ∼ N (0, σ 2IK ) ∈ RK is an i.i.d .
Gaussian noise with σ 2 variance and a K ×K identity matrix
IK , and 8 ∈ RL×K is a restricted isometry property (RIP)
random matrix. The probability density functions for the
hypothesis testing (5) can be derived:
p0(y) =
exp
{
− 12yT (σ 288T )−1y
}
(2pi )L/2
∣∣σ 288T ∣∣1/2 (6)
p1(y) =
exp
{
− 12 (y−8x)T (σ 288T )−1(y−8x)
}
(2pi )L/2
∣∣σ 288T ∣∣1/2 (7)
where T is a transpose operator and | · | is a matrix
determinant.
The optimal Neyman-Pearson (NP) detector for the
hypothesis testing (5) is a likelihood ratio test:
3(y) := p1(y)
p0(y)
H1
≷
H0
η
where η is a threshold. By taking logarithm, the final detector
in CS domain can be obtained as
yT (88T )−18x
H1
≷
H0
σ 2 log(η)+ 1
2
xT8T (88T )−18x
where the right side can be treated as a constant that does
not depend on the measurement y. Direct detection method
in CS domain yielded much better performance than indirect
detection method in signal domain after CS reconstruction
with sufficiently small amount of measurement [42]. This
observation is potentially useful for cancelable biometrics.
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III. METHODS
A. CANCELABLE ECG BIOMETRICS
Storing the enrolled ECG template t in (4) is necessary
in conventional ECG based user authentication, but once
compromised, the same template cannot be revoked and
re-used. Inspired by [42], we propose a cancelable ECG
biometrics with CSmeasurement based on the conjecture that
our proposed method does have reasonably good authentica-
tion performance while does not have enough measurements
for signal recovery. Note that Pillai et al. [27] proposed ran-
dom projection based template protection for iris recognition
with robust performance using sparse representation. This
approach recovers biometric features from projected data
while our proposed method performs user authentication in
projection domain without recovering any feature.
A compressive measurement for ECG can be constructed
using (1) as follows:
y = Hf = H(x+ n) (8)
where y ∈ RL with L  K , H is a modified Bernoulli
random matrix with the size of L × K with each ele-
ment of either 1/
√
K or −1/√K with probability 0.5, and
n ∼ N (0, σ 2IK ) with K × K identity matrix for simplicity.
It is worth noting that this particular random matrix H was
chosen because it only requires L(K − 1) summations, L
subtractions, and L divisions as well as a small storage of
LK bits. These properties can potentially be advantageous for
wearable bands with limited computing power and memory.
For the measurement model (8), we formulated a compos-
ite hypothesis test
H0 : y ∼ p0(y;Hx)
H1 : y ∼ p1(y;µ), µ 6= Hx (9)
where Hx ∈ RL , µ ∈ RL is a vector, and each hypothesis
probability density functions are
p0(y;Hx) =
exp
{
− 12 (y−Hx)T (σ 2HHT )−1(y−Hx)
}
(2pi )L/2
∣∣σ 2HHT ∣∣1/2 ,
(10)
p1(y;µ) =
exp
{
− 12 (y−µ)T (σ 2HHT )−1(y− µ)
}
(2pi )L/2
∣∣σ 2HHT ∣∣1/2 , (11)
respectively. The nearly-optimal GLRT is
3(y) = maxµ6=Hx p1(y;µ)
p0(y)
= p1(y; µˆML)
p0(y)
H1
≷
H0
γ (12)
where µˆML is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator for
p1(y;µ) and γ is a threshold. Since µˆML = y, the numerator
of (12) becomes a constant. Equation (12) can be further
simplified to
(y−Hx)T (HHT )−1(y−Hx) H1≷
H0
γ ′ (13)
where γ ′ determines the trade-off between detection proba-
bility and false alarm probability.
The ground truth ECG pulse x is not available, but the ECG
user template (3) can be a good ML estimator for it. By using
a ‘plug-in’ approach, the proposed CS-GLRT becomes
(y− yt)T (HHT )−1(y− yt) ≷ γ ′′. (14)
where our proposed secure user template yt :=Ht and γ ′′ is a
threshold. Note that yt andHwill be stored for authentication
so that the user template twill be protected. Even though both
yt and H are compromised, it will be challenging to recover
the original signal t from them if the length of yt is small
enough. We will further investigate this in the simulation.
B. PERMUTATION BASED REVOCATION PROCESS
Cancelable biometrics should provide a way to revoke current
secure user template and to regenerate a new one when it is
compromised. One naive approach is to regenerate a random
projection matrix H and a secure template yt=Ht as a revo-
cation process [45]. However, this procedure is vulnerable
to record multiplicity attack. Assume that both H1 and H1t
are compromised. Then, a new random matrix and secure
template can be generated again: H2 and H2t. Assuming
successful recordmultiplicity attack, an imposter may be able
to obtain enough number of random matrices H1, . . . ,HJ
and secure templates H1t, . . . ,HJ t to recover the original
signal t. This is possible because a stack of random matrices[
HT1 · · · HTJ
]T (15)
still satisfies RIP condition and a stack of secure templates
now provides enough number of measurements for excel-
lent CS recovery. In practice, record multiplicity attack is
quite challenging and secure templates may contain different
T-waves due to heart beat rate changes and noise. However,
with an extremely small probability, it is potentially possible
to obtain important P-QRS complex information of the orig-
inal user template t through record multiplicity attack.
Thus, we propose a permutation based revocation proce-
dure for CS based cancelable biometrics. Our permutation
process is purely random and it does not depend on any user
specific information. Instead of generating a new random
matrix H2 during the revocation process, we propose to ran-
domly permute the original H1 matrix to generate a new H˜1.
The matrixH1 can be represented as a stack of row vectors as:
H1 :=
[
h11 · · · h1L
]T (16)
where h1i ∈ RK for i = 1, . . . ,L. During the revocation pro-
cess, a permutation function τ (i) can be randomly generated
to construct a new random matrix
H˜1=
[
h1τ (1) · · · h1τ (L)
]T
. (17)
Note that L! (factorial) possible random permutation func-
tions exist for τ (i).
This newly generated matrix H˜1 and new secure template
H˜1t essentially does not provide any new information for CS
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FIGURE 1. Illustrations for conventional Euclidean based ECG biometrics
storing the original user template (top left), proposed GLRT based
cancelable ECG biometrics storing secure template H1t and H1 (top right),
previously proposed revocation process re-generating H2 and H2t [45]
(bottom left), and newly proposed revocation process permuting the rows
of H1 randomly to generate H˜1 and H˜1t to prevent record multiplicity
attack (bottom right).
recovery when H1 and H1t are available. More specifically,
H1 and H1t form a linear system of L equations with K
unknowns, but adding H˜1 and H˜1twill provide the equivalent
set of equations so that the problem remains as the same
linear system of L equations with K unknowns. In addition,
a stack of multiple randomly permuted matrices, similar
to (15), won’t be able to satisfy RIP condition for CS recovery.
Therefore, record multiplicity attack won’t be able to recover
the original user template t as far as L  K is small enough
to ensure non-invertibility. Fig. 1 illustrates the differences
among different revocation procedures.
C. SECURE PERFORMANCE BOOST I:
SELF-GUIDED FILTERING
It is well known that the performance degradation in can-
celable biometrics is inevitable [31], [35]. So, performance
boost methods for cancelable biometrics are desirable. For
improving performance in ECG biometrics, Chun proposed
to use a 1D guided filter (GF) for ECG authentication using
user template as a guide signal to yield improved perfor-
mance [43]. User template guided filtering is denoted as:
sˆ = GF(s; t) (18)
where t is the user template as a guided signal, s is an noisy
input signal for filtering, and sˆ is the output of the filter.
Using sˆ instead of s substantially improved authentication
performance in ECG biometrics [43]. This computation is
fast due to low computation complexity O(1) of GF since
it is essentially local affine fitting with efficient analytical
solution [52]. However, this scheme cannot be used for cance-
lable ECG biometrics since the user template tmust be stored.
We designed an irreversible transformation for user template
t for cancelable ECG biometrics [45] based on the following
observations:
1. GF with both flat and user template guide signals yielded
similarly good denoising results over P and T waves.
2. Having a good guide signal (e.g., user template) is critical
for good denoising performance in QRS complex.
FIGURE 2. Observations of various ECG GF results with user template and
flat signal. In P or T wave, GF with both guided signals achieved similar
denoising performance. However, In QRS complex, GF with flat signal
severely blurred the original ECG input signal, while user template based
GF preserved details.
These observations are illustrated in Fig. 2. However, the out-
put of the irreversible transformation still contains partial
information about the user template, which can potentially
weaken the security level of cancelable biometrics.
To eliminate partially stored user information for GF,
we propose a self-GF, generating a guide signal by mod-
ifying the input ECG signal s based on this additional
observation:
3. ECGQRS complex has high signal-to-noise ratio, so that
a single pulse QRS complex can be used as a guide
signal.
Note that the original GF also has self GF using input image
by blurring it [52]. However, since GF transfers information
in signals to the output, there will be a trade-off between pow-
erful denoising performance and detail preservation. Our pro-
posed self GF generates a guide signal for ECG denoising to
preserve details in QRS complex and to yield strong denois-
ing performance in P and T waves as illustrated in Fig. 3.
A new guide signal scrop contains QRS complex of input ECG
signal based on the 2nd and 3rd observations and flat signal
over P and T waves based on the 1st observation. Self-GF is
denoted by
sˆ = GF(s; scrop). (19)
Now no additional information about user template t is used
for GF, but self-GF still yields comparable performance
improvements to the original GF method with user template
(see Section IV for the results).
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FIGURE 3. Steps for generating a guide signal for self-GF using a single
pulse ECG: original input signal s (top left), cropping P and T wave areas
(top right), padding to reduce sudden signal changes for cropping points
(bottom left), and self-GF result (bottom right).
D. SECURE PERFORMANCE BOOST II: T-WAVE
SHIFT MODEL IN GLRT
GLRT based ECG authentication method using T-wave cir-
cular shift model was proposed to improve the authentication
performance for the case of having unknown heart rate vari-
ation [44]. This method also requires to use the original ECG
template t to find the minimum distance between the tem-
plate t and T-wave shifted ECG input s with unknown shift
value so that it is not appropriate for cancelable biometrics.
In here, we propose to incorporate T-wave shift model into
the proposed CS-GLRT in (14).
We first modeled the input signal s ∈ RK to be separated
into the PQRS segment sF ∈ RK1 and T wave segment
sS ∈ RK2 where K = K1 + K2. T wave can be modeled
to be shifted for different heart rate as follows:
sα :=
[
sF
0αsS
]
(20)
where 0α is a circular shift operator with a step size α ∈ Z.
Then, a composite hypothesis testing to consider variable
heart rate is constructed:
H0 : yα ∼ p0(y;Hx)
H1 : yα ∼ p1(y;µ), µ 6= Hx (21)
where p0, p1 are defined in (9), µ and α are unknown, and
yα = Hsα. Finally, a near-optimal GLRT with T wave shift
model is derived as follows:
max
µ 6=µ0,α
exp
(
− 12 (yα − µ)T (HHT )−1(yα − µ)
)
max
α
exp
(
− 12 (yα −Hx)T (HHT )−1(yα −Hx)
) . (22)
For the unknown x, a ‘plug-in’ approach can be used to
replace it by t. Since the numerator of (22) becomes 1 due
to the maximum likelihood estimator µ = yα , our proposed
GLRT can be simplified:
min
α
{(
yα − yt
)T
(HHT )−1
(
yα − yt
)} H1
≷
H0
γ (23)
where γ is a threshold.
Equation (23) is computationally expensive due to brute-
force search for α. We derived an equivalent operation for
(23) using matrix-vector form to speed up computation:
minD
{
(H0s − Y t)T (HHT )−1(H0s − Y t)
} H1
≷
H0
γ (24)
where Y t = [yt · · · yt] ∈ RL×K2 , D{·} is an operator to
extract diagonal elements to form a vector, and
0s =
[
sF · · · sF
01sS · · · 0K2sS
]
∈ RK×K2 . (25)
Equation (24) implies that the comparison between T waves
of input signal and enrolled user template is performed in CS
domain. This is valid if H is a RIP operator to approximately
preserve the distance between two signals after projection.
The matrix-vector form (24) substantially reduced computa-
tion cost since (24) consists of a simple operator to find the
minimum value in a vector and (25) can be generated quickly
using pre-computed indices for a given input signal vector
s. Note that our proposed GLRT with T-wave shift model
requires no additional enrolled user information unlike [44].
E. ANALYSES ON CANCELABLE BIOMETRICS CRITERIA
Here we analyzed our proposed CS-GLRT (14), revocation
procedure (17) and performance boost methods (19), (24) for
cancelable ECG biometrics to validate that they satisfy all
cancelable biometrics criteria [25].
Efficiency Our proposed CS-GLRT (14) is based on a com-
posite hypothesis testing in CS domain and on a nearly opti-
mal GLRT detector for it to minimize performance degrada-
tion due to cancelable schemes. We also developed self-GF
for effective denoising (19) and incorporated T-wave shift
model into CS-GLRT (24) without compromising security
and near-optimality. In Section IV-C, simulation results will
support our argument by showing that the proposed cance-
lable CS-GLRT yielded performance comparable to or even
better than the non-cancelable baseline.
Re-usability Our proposed revocation method (17) ensures
robustness to record multiplicity attack as well as re-
usability. Once a stored secure template Ht and/or a ran-
dom matrix H are compromised, a new matrix H˜ will be
generated by randomly permuting the rows of the previous
H. Then, a new user template H˜t can also be generated with
a new user template t and then t will be discarded. Finally,
H˜t and H˜ will be re-used for authentication. For example,
if L = 30, then L! ≈ 2.65 × 1032 different pairs can be
generated, so this revocation process ensures re-usability.
Diversity In two different applications, two random matri-
ces H ∈ RL×K ’s can be generated and the probability
that these two matrices are the same will be 1/2LK where
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L  K . With the proposed permutation based revocation
procedure (17), the probability of having the same matrices
up to random row permutation is
L!/2LK (26)
This is almost zero in our cancelable ECG biometrics.
For example, our simulation used a random matrix H ∈
R32×320 and (26) becomes about 1/(3.5× 1070) ≈ 0.
Non-invertibility Cancelable ECG template must be
obtained using non-invertible transformation to prevent the
recovery of biometric data from secure template. In CS the-
ory, the original signal can be recovered with a random
matrix H if both H and yt are available and the size of
the vector yt is large enough. Thus, the size of a CS
measurement yt should be determined to ensure efficiency
(the larger, the better) as well as to ensure non-invertibility
(the smaller, the better). Since CS signal recovery seems
to require much larger measurements than CS signal detec-
tion does [42], it is possible to determine appropriate size
of measurement for both efficiency and non-invertibility.
We investigated this issue for our cancelable ECG biomet-
rics (14) with simulation in Section IV-E for the worst case
with compromised H and yt. Note that this case should
rarely happen: FIDO22 allows biometrics to be only used
locally for a variety of applications on the internet and
a random matrix H can possibly be stored securely and
used with hardware such as smart card. This worst case is
considered as one of the strongest attacks [53].
Our revocation procedure (17) is also resilient to record
multiplicity attack that multiple pairs of H and yt are com-
promised. As discussed in Section III-B, a stack of 2 ormore
random matrices from our proposed permutation based
revocation processes will compromise the RIP condition of
thematrix stack.Moreover, multiple pairs ofH and yt won’t
provide additional information to a single pair of H and yt
due to row permutation of H. We will study this worst case
with simulations in Section IV-F.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We investigated our proposed methods of cancelable ECG
biometrics using CS-GLRT (14), self-GF (19), GLRT with
T-wave shift model (24), and random permutation based revo-
cation process (17) with the public ECG-ID dataset [46] from
the PhysioNet [47]. MATLAB was used for all implementa-
tions (The Mathworks, Inc., MA, USA).
A. ECG DATA SET AND PRE-PROCESSING
The ECG-ID data set consists of ECG pulses from 90 subjects
with recordings on the same or different days [46]. Each
raw record was acquired for about 20 seconds with 500 Hz
sampling rate, 12-bit resolution. This data set also provides
pre-processed ECG signals reducing baseline draft, power-
line noise, and high-frequency noise [46]. The pre-processed
ECG data was used in our simulations.
2https://fidoalliance.org/
Two records per subject from ECG-ID were used in our
simulations (89 subjects). Each record was processed using
the Pan-Tompkins method for R-peak detection [49]. Then,
each ECG record was segmented with the length of 320 sam-
ples (0.64 second), which are −134, +185 samples from
the R-peak covering all P-QRS-T fragment. From selected
12 ECG pulses, an average ECG template was generated. One
record was used for ECG template generation and the other
record was used for user authentication test with cross vali-
dation. Compressive sensing random matrix for each person
was generated where the numbers of CS measurements are
32, 96, and 160 samples.
For the performance evaluation, we adopt PD* and EER
where PD* is detection probability at FAR= 2% and EER is
a point where false rejection rate (FRR) = FAR =: EER.
FIGURE 4. Examples of CS measurements of an ECG pulse (top left) for
160 (top right), 96 (bottom left), and 32 samples (bottom right).
TABLE 1. Performance summary of CS-GLRT. Cancelable biometrics
yielded results comparable to non-cancelable baseline (Euclidean) with
mild performance degradation.
B. CANCELABLE ECG BIOMETRICS USING CS-GLRT
Fig. 4 illustrates examples of CS measurements from a
ECG pulse with 160, 96, and 32 samples. All CS mea-
surements look like random noise, but they contain infor-
mation about the original ECG pulse with 320 samples.
We found experimentally that CS measurement with 32 sam-
ples yielded reasonable authentication performance while
was practically non-invertible since CS recovered template
yielded poor authentication performance. Table 1 summa-
rizes authentication performance results for non-cancelable
baseline (Euclidean distance in signal domain), CS-Euclidean
with 32 samples (Euclidean distance in CS domain), and
proposed CS-GLRTwith 32 samples. Both CS-Euclidean and
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CS-GLRT with 32 samples yielded performance compara-
ble to the non-cancelable baseline with mild performance
degradation. CS-GLRT yielded better performance than
CS-Euclidean in both PD* and EER. However, the perfor-
mance gap between them was slight since HHT in (14)
is close to a diagonal matrix with a constant so that (14)
becomes similar to CS-Euclidean.
C. SECURE PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS
IN CS DOMAIN
The guide signal for self-GF in (19) was generated as
illustrated in Fig. 3. More specifically, QRS complex was
extracted from 0.218 sec to 0.342 sec among 0.64 sec
for each ECG pulse of all subjects and other intervals of
(0 sec - 0.218 sec, 0.342 sec - 0.64 sec) were padded with
values to ensure the continuity of the resulting signal so that
sharp transitions are not transferred to the denoising output.
For CS-GLRT with T-wave shift model (24), the length of
the T-wave part was chosen to be K2 = 140 samples
(0.28 sec) for all subjects (the whole length of ECG pulse
is K = 320 samples, 0.64 sec). The parameter α for circular
shift operator sweeps from 0 to 140 samples with the step size
of 2 samples.
TABLE 2. Performance summary when using performance boost
methods. Proposed tricks significantly improved performance over
CS-GLRT, yielded results comparable to the baseline.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the two proposed per-
formance boost tricks for GLRT based cancelable ECG bio-
metrics. When using GF with user template guide signal [43],
significant performance increase was observed in terms of all
performance metrics over the cancelable baseline, CS-GLRT
with 32 samples. However, it does require storing the enrolled
user template t. Self-GF for CS-GLRT yielded comparable
performance to CS-GLRT using GF with user template while
it does not require storing additional enrolled user informa-
tion. T-wave shift model in CS-GLRT yielded substantially
better EER and better PD* than CS-GLRT. Lastly, using both
performance boost methods yielded significantly improved
performance over CS-GLRT. This method, CS-GLRT with
32 samples, self-GF and T-wave, yielded substantially better
performance than the non-cancelable baseline in Table 1 in
EER and also yielded comparable performance in PD*.
D. CANCELABLE BIOMETRICS CRITERIA: EFFICIENCY
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrated that the proposed cancelable
biometrics methods are efficient since the authentication
performance of them is comparable to or better than
the non-cancelable baseline using Euclidean distance and
user template. The RIP condition of a random matrix H
theoretically guarantees that the distance between two signals
can be well-preserved after projections using H so that the
distance between secure user template yt and projected input
signal Hs can be well-evaluated [30], [50], [51]. In addition,
nearly optimal CS-GLRT with two performance improve-
ment methods (self-GF, T-wave model in CS-GLRT) enabled
CS-GLRT to be efficient as a cancelable ECG biometrics.
E. CANCELABLE BIOMETRICS CRITERIA:
NON-INVERTIBILITY
Non-invertibility of our proposed methods was evaluated
using simulations with 89 subjects in ECG-ID data set. ECG
signal recovery from CS measurement was performed by
solving the following minimization problem:
tˆ = argmin
t
‖yt −Ht‖22 + β‖Wt‖1 (27)
using approximate message passing (AMP) with Daubechies
wavelet transform W for promoting sparsity of the recon-
structed signal [40]. However, any converged convex opti-
mization can yield the same solution for (27).
FIGURE 5. CS recovery results of ECG signals from CS measurements with
160 (top right), 96 (bottom left), and 32 samples (bottom right). CS
recovered signals with 32 samples (bottom right) lost distinct shape
information about the original signal (top left).
Fig. 5 illustrates the examples of recovered ECG signals
from CSmeasurements with 160, 96, and 32 samples, respec-
tively. The less CS measurements were used for recovery,
the more distinct features of the original signal such as
P, T waves are lost in the reconstructed signals.When 32 sam-
ples were used, almost no ECG figures were recovered from
CS measurement visually. However, CS measurement with
32 samples was still able to achieve good hypothesis testing
performance as shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Further simulation was performed for investigating the
authentication performance of CS recovered signals. Fig. 6
illustrates the authentication performance changes for differ-
ent CS sample numbers for an enrolled user (User) and for
an imposter who reconstructed a signal from H and yt and
then used it for authentication (Imposter w/ recon signal).
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FIGURE 6. Plots of EER (top) and PD* (bottom) versus number of CS
samples. Reconstructed signals from small number of CS samples
(Imposter) yielded significantly worse authentication performance than
the original signal (User) in both EER and PD*.
With large amount of CS samples, both User and Imposter
achieved good authentication performance. However, with
small amount of samples, User achieved significantly better
performance in user authentication than Imposter. It looks
infeasible for Imposter to be successful in authentication if
there is a proper authentication lock (preventing multiple
attempts).
F. RECORD MULTIPLICITY ATTACK
We also investigated record multiplicity attack with two
different revocation procedures: random re-generation of H
(randomly generated) [45] and our proposed random re-
permutation of H (randomly permuted) in (17). Fig. 7
shows the plot of EER versus the number of success-
ful attacks. F number of record multiplicity attacks for
random re-generation based revocation process essentially
allows imposter to recover the original signal using CS
recovery algorithm with CS measurements F times more
than the original CS samples. However, multiple times of
recordmultiplicity attacks for our random row re-permutation
based revocation process prevent Imposter achieving good
authentication performance. This result shows that our pro-
posed revocation process is resilient to record multiplicity
attack.
FIGURE 7. Simulation result of record multiplicity attack when using
32 compressive samples for authentication. As the number of attacks
increases, EER for random re-generation based revocation decreases
(Randomly generated - Imposter). However, EER for the proposed random
re-permutation based revocation remains around poor EER (Randomly
permuted - Imposter).
V. DISCUSSION
In this article, we proposed cancelable ECG biometrics
methods using composite hypothesis testing in CS domain.
We showed that these proposedmethods yielded performance
comparable to or better than the non-cancelable baseline with
small amount of samples (10% in simulations) that were
not enough for recovering the original signal properly. The
proposed CS-GLRT detector in CS domain seems to use CS
samples more efficiently than detectors with recovered sig-
nals fromCSmeasurements. This is an important property for
cancelable biometrics with efficiency and non-invertibility.
Even though the detection probability of imposter (PD*)
was about 30% as shown in Fig. 6, it may be possible to
try authentication multiple times to increase the chance of
success. For that, it is possible to protect the system by
limiting the number of tries, which is similar to ‘password
lock’ that blocks an incoming user with several authentication
failures. Another protection method is to use FIDO23 for
biometrics. In this case, our proposed method can be used
locally so that strong protection on cancelable user templates
becomes possible while a variety of services on the internet
can be used without revealing secure user template online.
Our proposed schemes could provide secure ECG bio-
metrics to the cases with limited access to others’ ECG
data or with limited computation power and memory.
Examples are low-cost wearable bands with ECG sensors
such as [18] or other recently commercialized wearable
bands/sensors. We, along with other researchers, have
showed that it is possible to achieve state-of-the-art authenti-
cation performance (0.1% EER) with multimodal biometrics
using ECG and MSP (multispectral skin photomatrix) by
storing all user information [18]. Since our proposed meth-
ods yielded comparable performance to the baseline ECG
3https://fidoalliance.org/
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biometrics, it seems possible for our proposed cancelable
biometrics methods to achieve similar state-of-the-art authen-
tication performance in a secure way.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a cancelable ECG biometric using CS based
composite hypothesis testing (CS-GLRT), developed a novel
random row permutation based revocation process for being
resilient to record multiplicity attack, and investigated their
cancelable biometrics properties. We further investigated two
performance improvementmethods to compensate for perfor-
mance degradation due to the proposed cancelable biometric
schemes. Our proposed methods were practically cancelable,
but still yielded up to 93.0%PD* and 3.8%EERwith the pub-
lic ECG-ID data set (89 subjects) for challenging single pulse
ECG, that is comparable to or better than non-cancelable
baseline. Our proposed methods can provide a secure ECG
biometrics towearable bands / deviceswith ECG sensors or to
multimodal biometrics for achieving state-of-the-art authen-
tication performance.
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